Abstract
This study explores the phenomenon of merit display in Tehran’s governmental organizations, defined as the use of symbolic capital to secure professional positions without genuine competencies (knowledge, skills, or performance). Merit display undermines meritocracy and organizational trust in bureaucratic settings with weak oversight, a pressing issue in Tehran’s public sector where informal evidence suggests its prevalence. The research aims to identify the causal factors, contextual conditions, action strategies, and consequences of merit display, providing a localized framework to enhance meritocracy and trust. The main research question is: What are the factors, contexts, strategies, and outcomes of merit display in Tehran’s governmental organizations? The primary hypothesis posits that merit display arises from the interplay of individual, organizational, and socio-cultural factors, resulting in diminished trust and meritocracy. Employing a qualitative grounded theory approach, data were collected through 45- to 60-minute semi-structured interviews with 27 government employees in the second half of 1403 (2024). Analysis involved open, axial, and selective coding using MAXQDA software, with credibility ensured through triangulation (comparing interviews with observations and documents), member checking by 15 participants, and peer debriefing in three group discussions. Findings reveal that merit display is driven by causal factors (feigned confidence, superficial self-presentation, unethical networking), contextual conditions (inefficient bureaucratic structures, display-oriented culture, social media influence), and action strategies (displaying confidence, superficial reports, informal relationships). These lead to reduced organizational trust, weakened meritocracy, and eroded motivation and professional cohesion. Integrating theories by Bourdieu (1986), Spence (1973), and Greenberg (1990), the study proposes practical solutions, including transparent evaluation systems, fostering collaborative culture, and training managers to prioritize authentic competencies. Future research could employ quantitative methods or explore managers’ perspectives to further advance understanding of merit display in Iran’s public sector.
Keywords: Merit Display, Governmental Organizations, Grounded Theory, Symbolic Capital, Organizational Trust.

1. Introduction
Meritocracy, a cornerstone of effective human resource management, emphasizes allocating positions and opportunities based on genuine competencies such as knowledge, skills, and performance. However, in bureaucratic environments with weak oversight, the phenomenon of merit display—using symbolic capital like feigned confidence, superficial self-presentation, or unethical networking to gain professional positions without authentic qualifications—poses a significant challenge. In Tehran’s governmental organizations, the hub of Iran’s administrative activities, informal reports suggest merit display undermines meritocracy and organizational trust. Unlike corruption or favoritism, merit display operates within normative or deviant settings, leveraging symbolic cues to create a false impression of competence. This study employs a grounded theory approach to explore the causal factors, contextual conditions, action strategies, and consequences of merit display, aiming to provide a localized framework for analysis and practical recommendations to strengthen meritocracy and trust. Existing literature, including Bourdieu’s (1986) symbolic capital, Spence’s (1973) signaling theory, and Greenberg’s (1990) organizational justice, offers theoretical insights but lacks application in Iran’s bureaucratic and cultural context. This research fills this gap by addressing the unique socio-cultural and structural dynamics of Tehran’s public sector.

2. Theoretical Framework
The study draws on Bourdieu’s (1986) concept of symbolic capital, which posits that individuals use symbolic cues (e.g., professional demeanor, attire) to gain status without substantive qualifications. Spence’s (1973) signaling theory complements this by highlighting how individuals project false competencies to influence perceptions. Greenberg’s (1990) organizational justice framework underscores the impact of perceived unfairness on trust and motivation, relevant to merit display’s consequences. Additionally, studies like Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical perspective and Turkle’s (2011) analysis of social media’s role in self-presentation inform the socio-cultural dimensions. Empirical research, such as Fani et al. (2012) on managerial competencies in Tehran and Shahnooshi and Dadkhah (2017) on meritocracy barriers, highlights local challenges but lacks focus on merit display as a distinct phenomenon. This study integrates these theories and empirical findings to analyze merit display in Tehran’s context.

3. Methodology
A qualitative grounded theory approach, following Strauss and Corbin (1998), was employed to explore merit display. Data were collected through 45- to 60-minute semi-structured interviews with 27 government employees in Tehran during the second half of 1403 (2024). Participants were selected via purposive sampling to ensure diversity in age, gender, education, job role, and experience, achieving theoretical saturation after 22 interviews, with five additional interviews for comprehensiveness. Interview questions probed lived experiences, perceptions, and observations of merit display, such as: “Have you observed individuals advancing through superficial displays of competence?” and “What organizational factors enable such behaviors?” Data were analyzed using open, axial, and selective coding with MAXQDA software. Open coding identified initial categories (e.g., feigned confidence, weak evaluation), axial coding organized them around the core category of merit display, and selective coding developed the phenomenon’s storyline. Credibility was ensured through triangulation (comparing interviews with observations and documents), member checking by 15 participants, and peer debriefing in three group discussions. Ethical considerations included informed consent, confidentiality, and secure data storage.

4. Findings
The analysis revealed merit display as a systemic phenomenon in Tehran’s governmental organizations, shaped by the interplay of causal factors, contextual conditions, action strategies, and consequences.
4-1. Causal Factors
- Individual Factors: Feigned confidence, superficial self-presentation (e.g., professional attire, flashy presentations), and unethical networking (e.g., leveraging informal relationships) drive merit display. For instance, a participant noted, “Some colleagues act overly confident in meetings, but their work lacks depth, yet they get promoted due to managers’ lack of scrutiny.”
- Organizational Factors: Weak evaluation systems, lack of corrective feedback, and bureaucratic complexities create oversight gaps, enabling merit display. One respondent stated, “Without transparent evaluations, managers focus on flashy reports, not real work.”
- Socio-Cultural Factors: A display-oriented culture, amplified by social media (e.g., LinkedIn profiles exaggerating expertise), and weak shared professional values encourage merit display. A participant observed, “Some post professional content online, but their actual work is minimal.”
4-2. Contextual Conditions
- Inefficient Structures: Bureaucratic complexities and weak supervision facilitate merit display by allowing superficial behaviors to go unchecked. A respondent remarked, “Complex structures make oversight difficult; some advance with empty reports.”
- Display-Oriented Culture: Organizational and societal emphasis on appearances over substance fosters merit display. One employee noted, “Flashy presentations get more attention than real work.”
- Social Media Influence: Platforms amplify false competency displays, especially in organizations sensitive to public perception. A participant said, “LinkedIn posts make some look professional, but their output is negligible.”
4-3. Action Strategies
Employees use strategies like displaying excessive confidence, producing superficial reports or presentations, mimicking successful professionals, building informal relationships with managers, and leveraging social media for visibility. For example, a respondent noted, “Some mimic managers’ styles or use LinkedIn to appear competent, securing promotions despite weak performance.”
4-4. Consequences
- Reduced Organizational Trust: Merit display fosters distrust in promotion systems and perceptions of unfairness. A participant stated, “When someone advances with flashy slides but no substance, trust in the system erodes.”
- Weakened Meritocracy: The prioritization of appearances over competencies undermines merit-based advancement, reducing organizational performance quality. One employee said, “Promoting unqualified people harms decision-making.”
- Eroded Motivation and Cohesion: Merit display demotivates competent employees and weakens team collaboration, eroding professional culture. A respondent noted, “Seeing displayers succeed discourages hardworking staff.”

5. Discussion
The findings align with Bourdieu’s (1986) symbolic capital, where individuals use superficial cues to gain status, and Spence’s (1973) signaling theory, which explains false competency displays. Greenberg’s (1990) organizational justice framework highlights how perceived unfairness from merit display reduces trust and motivation. The study extends these theories by contextualizing them in Tehran’s bureaucratic and cultural setting, emphasizing local factors like bureaucratic complexities and social media’s role, which prior studies (e.g., Turkle, 2011; Marwick, 2015) addressed in Western contexts. The research also corroborates local studies (e.g., Fani et al., 2012) on weak evaluation systems but uniquely defines merit display as distinct from corruption, filling a research gap.
Practical Implications: To counter merit display, organizations should:
1. Implement transparent, objective performance evaluation systems.
2. Establish regular, corrective feedback mechanisms.
3. Foster a culture prioritizing genuine competencies and collaboration.
4. Train managers to recognize authentic qualifications over superficial displays.
5. Regulate professional use of social media to curb false representations.
These measures can rebuild trust, strengthen meritocracy, and enhance professional cohesion.
Limitations: The study is limited to 27 employees in Tehran, potentially missing broader Iranian contexts. The qualitative approach restricts statistical generalizability, and data exclude senior managers’ or policymakers’ perspectives. External factors like political or technological changes were not fully explored.

6. Conclusion
Merit display in Tehran’s governmental organizations emerges from individual (e.g., feigned confidence), organizational (e.g., weak evaluations), and socio-cultural (e.g., display-oriented culture) factors, facilitated by strategies like superficial presentations and informal networking. It results in reduced trust, weakened meritocracy, and eroded motivation. By integrating Bourdieu, Spence, and Greenberg’s theories, this study offers a localized framework and practical solutions like transparent evaluations and cultural reforms. Future research could use quantitative methods or explore senior managers’ views to deepen understanding.